Each one in plain English, with the numbers worked through for a shareholder.
13 July 2012capital raising announcement▼ BadMajor
Brought in a second toxic-debt lender, JMJ Financial, with a $550,000 promissory note carrying a 10% original issue discount -- North Bay's borrowing needs had outgrown what Tangiers alone was providing.
Took on a $100,000 Tangiers note at a lower 7% interest rate but with the conversion floor cut to $0.02 -- terms kept loosening in Tangiers' favor as North Bay's dependence on this single lender deepened.
Borrowed another $75,000 from Tangiers on similar convertible-note terms, with the conversion price now down to $0.09 -- North Bay's stock price and financing terms were both drifting lower.
Took on $100,000 more from Tangiers via two convertible notes at a fixed $0.08 conversion price plus warrants -- the toxic-debt financing continued at a steady clip through early 2012.
Borrowed another $50,000 from Tangiers, split between a straight promissory note and a convertible note, with biweekly cash paydowns drawn against North Bay's existing Tangiers equity line -- financing was tightening into a cycle of new Tangiers debt funding repayment of old Tangiers debt.
Terminated its Fawn & Buck joint-venture/option agreement with Silver Quest Resources after Silver Quest defaulted and failed to cure within the required 60 days, regaining full ownership of the claims.
1 July 2011asset acquisition disposition▲ GoodMajor
Completed the Ruby Mine acquisition: Ruby Gold, Inc. became a wholly-owned North Bay subsidiary after paying RDC an aggregate $510,000 -- North Bay's flagship asset for the rest of its public life, and the mortgage debt underlying it would become a recurring source of financial strain.
Fully satisfied the remaining balance of a Tangiers note from December 2010 through a share conversion, continuing the running pattern of debt-to-equity conversions with this lender.
Amended the Ruby Mine option again, accelerating the exercise deadline to June 1, 2011 and raising the final payment to $85,000, in exchange for lower monthly carrying costs -- the deal was being restructured under financial pressure but was moving toward closing.
Agreed to sell more Slocan District claims to Argentum Exploration for $50,000 cash plus a 2% smelter royalty -- Argentum would later default on the payments and North Bay would terminate the deal in July 2011.
Partially converted yet another Tangiers note into 975,000 shares, leaving about $22,000 still outstanding -- the Tangiers relationship was now North Bay's primary funding source.
Converted a second Tangiers note ($50,000 principal) into 1.6 million shares at 80% of the recent low price, continuing the same dilutive financing pattern.
Hired a geological consultant for a mix of cash and restricted stock, with a 10% finder's fee on any financing or JV he brings in for the Canadian properties -- routine, not strategic.
Converted a $17,500 Tangiers note (plus interest) into 863,681 shares at 80% of the recent low trading price -- the first of many dilutive conversions on the Tangiers debt.
Agreed to sell several Slocan District, British Columbia mineral claims to Yardley Mountain Gold for $93,000, payable in installments -- one of several small Canadian claim sales North Bay would use to raise cash while it worked to close the Ruby Mine deal.
Renegotiated the Ruby Mine option with Ruby Development Company (RDC), cutting near-term option payments but pushing more of the cost into mid-2011 -- a sign North Bay was already stretched to keep the Ruby option alive.
Sold an 8% convertible note for $50,000 to Asher Enterprises at a 45% discount to market on conversion -- a second toxic-debt lender within the same week as the first.
Borrowed $50,000 from Tangiers Investors under a convertible note earmarked for Ruby Mine option payments and permit costs -- the note converts at a steep discount to market (70% of the lowest trading price), the start of a long run of dilutive toxic-debt financing.