Each one in plain English, with the numbers worked through for a shareholder.
30 Jan 2013capital raising announcement▼ Bad
Converted part of the JMJ Financial note into shares to pay down roughly $132,000 of accrued principal, interest and fees -- the JMJ note would go on to be tapped for dozens of small conversions over the next several years.
Got Tangiers to waive default/conversion rights on several notes and extend maturities by 24 months -- a forbearance arrangement suggesting North Bay could not keep pace with its own convertible-note obligations.
Issued a $750,000 promissory note to Tangiers, funded in $50,000 tranches, convertible at the prevailing market price -- Tangiers remained North Bay's largest single creditor.
Issued a $100,000 convertible note to a third toxic-debt lender, Tonaquint, Inc., with a fixed $0.06 conversion price and a self-amortizing repayment schedule -- the lender roster kept expanding.
13 July 2012capital raising announcement▼ BadMajor
Brought in a second toxic-debt lender, JMJ Financial, with a $550,000 promissory note carrying a 10% original issue discount -- North Bay's borrowing needs had outgrown what Tangiers alone was providing.
Took on a $100,000 Tangiers note at a lower 7% interest rate but with the conversion floor cut to $0.02 -- terms kept loosening in Tangiers' favor as North Bay's dependence on this single lender deepened.
Borrowed another $75,000 from Tangiers on similar convertible-note terms, with the conversion price now down to $0.09 -- North Bay's stock price and financing terms were both drifting lower.
Took on $100,000 more from Tangiers via two convertible notes at a fixed $0.08 conversion price plus warrants -- the toxic-debt financing continued at a steady clip through early 2012.
Borrowed another $50,000 from Tangiers, split between a straight promissory note and a convertible note, with biweekly cash paydowns drawn against North Bay's existing Tangiers equity line -- financing was tightening into a cycle of new Tangiers debt funding repayment of old Tangiers debt.
Fully satisfied the remaining balance of a Tangiers note from December 2010 through a share conversion, continuing the running pattern of debt-to-equity conversions with this lender.
Amended the Ruby Mine option again, accelerating the exercise deadline to June 1, 2011 and raising the final payment to $85,000, in exchange for lower monthly carrying costs -- the deal was being restructured under financial pressure but was moving toward closing.
Partially converted yet another Tangiers note into 975,000 shares, leaving about $22,000 still outstanding -- the Tangiers relationship was now North Bay's primary funding source.
Converted a second Tangiers note ($50,000 principal) into 1.6 million shares at 80% of the recent low price, continuing the same dilutive financing pattern.
Hired a geological consultant for a mix of cash and restricted stock, with a 10% finder's fee on any financing or JV he brings in for the Canadian properties -- routine, not strategic.
Converted a $17,500 Tangiers note (plus interest) into 863,681 shares at 80% of the recent low trading price -- the first of many dilutive conversions on the Tangiers debt.
Renegotiated the Ruby Mine option with Ruby Development Company (RDC), cutting near-term option payments but pushing more of the cost into mid-2011 -- a sign North Bay was already stretched to keep the Ruby option alive.
Sold an 8% convertible note for $50,000 to Asher Enterprises at a 45% discount to market on conversion -- a second toxic-debt lender within the same week as the first.
Borrowed $50,000 from Tangiers Investors under a convertible note earmarked for Ruby Mine option payments and permit costs -- the note converts at a steep discount to market (70% of the lowest trading price), the start of a long run of dilutive toxic-debt financing.